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Abstract
In this article, we address the historical question of why 
Aegean Bronze Age economies are characterized as redis-
tributive systems and whether it is appropriate to continue 
to describe them as such. We argue that characterizing 
the political economies of the Aegean as redistributive 
is inaccurate and misleading. Instead, we suggest it is 
more fruitful to describe how specific prehistoric social 
institutions were used to organize and allocate goods and 
services and thereby to study how political and economic 
systems interacted with one another. By examining how 
Aegean social institutions were constituted and changed 
over time, we will be in a position to use the prehistoric 
Aegean to develop and refine general models of political 
economy.*
introduction
The political economies associated with the Bronze 
Age societies of the Greek mainland and Crete are fre-
quently described as “redistributive.”1 At a basic level, 
this makes sense because archaeological and textual 
data document the movement of goods in and out of 
central sites and palatial buildings. Although the con-
cept of redistributive economies is known within an-
thropological archaeology primarily through the work 
of Polanyi, the typological label was applied to the Ae-
gean by Finley to highlight the significant differences 
he perceived between the economies of the Greek 
Bronze Age and the Near East, on the one hand, and 
those of the Greek and Roman historical periods, on 
the other.2 Finley recognized that his economic models 
were simplified abstractions or types that were helpful 
in classifying economic systems in a general fashion. 
They were not historical realities. But when moving 
from general economic history (Finley’s “dominant 
types”) to specific historical contexts, such generaliza-
tions may obscure more than they reveal.3
Constructing models of how ancient societies were 
organized forces us to negotiate constantly between 
general models and historical (or specific) models.4 
Whereas general models tend to blur variation at the 
local level to facilitate comparison, historical models 
hinder generalization by providing too many details 
particular to a specific region or social trajectory. The 
best theoretical approaches successfully negotiate be-
tween both kinds of models, using specific historical 
examples to help refine and develop general models.5 
When scholars fail to differentiate between these dif-
ferent kinds of models, modern abstractions can be 
mistaken for prehistoric realities. As Berdan noted in 
her review of economies in precapitalist states, “the 
Polanyi approach of characterizing certain economies 
as ‘redistributive’ or ‘market’ is therefore less fruitful 
than an approach that accepts the presence of a va-
riety of exchange strategies and seeks to unravel the 
relationships among them.”6 This, we argue, has been 
the case with the historical tendency to character-
ize political economies in the Bronze Age Aegean as 
“redistributive”—a general model has been conflated 
with a specific model, and consequently, it is hard to 
see the trees for the forest.
redistribution and the aegean bronze age
Polanyi initially outlined the concepts of reciprocity 
and redistribution as complements to market exchange 
in all types of societies. He defined reciprocity as sym-
metrical exchanges between social units and redistri-
* We thank Seth Richardson and an anonymous AJA re-
viewer for their valuable suggestions.
1 Bendall 2007, 6–9; Killen 2008.
2 E.g., Finley 1957; 1999, esp. 28–9; Polanyi 1966.
3 Finley 1999, 29.
4 Parkinson 2010.
5 Weber 1978, 19–20; Morris 1999, xxxii.
6 Berdan 1989, 106; see also Feinman and Garraty 2010.
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bution as a pattern of exchanges defined by centricity: 
goods and labor flow into a central authority and back 
out of it again (fig. 1).7 These were core concepts of 
Polanyi’s project, although they did not apply only to 
archaic economies: reciprocity and redistribution as 
concepts were intentionally and explicitly kept quite 
broad in scope.8 All economies for Polanyi could be 
analyzed using the three basic concepts of reciprocity, 
redistribution, and market exchange. These were not 
mutually exclusive categories, although usually one of 
these types was the dominant mode of transaction in 
a given society.
Polanyi’s most extensive discussion of redistribution 
is his description of 18th-century Dahomey, in modern 
Benin.9 In the Annual Customs tradition, every fam-
ily in the kingdom assembled to participate in rituals 
and protocols associated with the renewal of the social 
order.10 The king received massive payments of gifts 
and tribute heaped up on a platform, which he then 
publicly redistributed as royal gifts to the assembled 
populace. This process was the principal mode whereby 
the administration and its officers were financed. The 
king of Dahomey controlled the economy very tightly: 
farmers were told by royal administrators, for example, 
which crops to grow, so that certain districts special-
ized in millet, while others grew only maize.11 Markets 
were instituted by the king and supervised by royal of-
ficials, who ensured that all buyers used cowrie shells, 
which they had been given by the king during the An-
nual Customs.12 In short, “redistribution proper” was 
associated by Polanyi with chiefly societies, in which 
he envisaged large quantities of goods flowing in and 
out of the center, quantities that constituted the vast 
majority of the community’s total produce.13
Polanyi’s discussions of reciprocity and redistribu-
tion were adopted by multilineal evolutionary theo-
rists in anthropology, especially Sahlins, Service, and 
Fried.14 In their writings, these mechanisms of ex-
change became associated with specific social types, 
thereby limiting the wider analytical scope originally 
intended by Polanyi: reciprocity was the dominant 
mode of exchange in egalitarian societies, and redis-
tribution in chiefdoms. The most important develop-
ment for the Aegean case is that redistribution became 
equated with the pooling of goods.
For Service and Fried, redistribution was one of 
the most significant causes of the emergence and 
perpetuation of leadership. The role of redistribution 
in chiefdoms provided a solution to the problematic 
transition from egalitarian groups to powerful states 
with a monopoly of legitimate violence. Redistribution, 
it was argued, emerged as an efficient cultural adapta-
tion to agricultural specialization in areas with many 
ecological niches.15 Initially, redistribution was under-
stood to be little more than the collection of reciprocal 
exchanges. So-called big men in egalitarian societies 
seemingly altruistically pooled substantial quantities of 
goods while skimming a little off the top. As produc-
tion increased, the power of the big man increased, 
permitting the emergence of a permanent office of 
chief. Service described the “organismic solidarity” 
produced by redistribution: each household carried 
out specific specialized crafts and was incorporated 
into the system like different parts of an organism, 
and each unit depended on the smooth functioning 
of the whole.16 This is the conception of redistribution 
7 Dalton 1968, xxxv; Polanyi 1968, 208.
8 Dalton 1968, xxxvi.
9 Polanyi 1968, 207–37 (excerpted from Polanyi 1966). 
Whether his description is historically accurate is not impor-
tant for our purposes; for a critique of Polanyi’s description of 
the Annual Customs, see Testart 2005, 74.
10 Polanyi 1968, 207–10.
11 Polanyi 1968, 214.
12 Polanyi 1968, 215.
13 Polanyi 1968, 9–10, 13. Elsewhere, Polanyi (1957a, 254) 
states that redistribution occurs “on all civilizational levels.”
14 Fried 1967; Sahlins 1972; Service 1975.
15 Service 1975, 75. Service’s theory of ecological specializa-
tion seems inspired by a statement by Polanyi (1957a, 254): 
“in large countries differences of soil and climate may make 
redistribution necessary.”
16 Service 1975, 95.
Fig. 1. Classic redistribution (after Liverani 2005, fig. 1b).
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that Renfrew brought into Aegean prehistory with The 
Emergence of Civilisation.17
In the Old World, there already was a model of the 
Near Eastern temple-city, in which all land belonged 
to the temple and the entire populace worked under 
its management in exchange for subsistence rations. 
This model was most famously articulated by the As-
syriologist Deimel in 1931, and it influenced Polanyi’s 
characterization of Near Eastern economies as redis-
tributive.18 This model remained unchallenged until 
the mid 1950s, and early scholarship of the Mycenaean 
texts (esp. Finley, Ventris, and Polanyi himself) relied 
heavily on it.19 Finley, for example, described pal-
ace economies as comprising “a single complicated, 
bureaucratic, record-keeping operation,” which he 
termed “rationing”—that is, redistribution.20
These anthropological and Assyriological models 
share several important features. First, they generally 
are associated with complex societies: chiefdoms in an-
thropology and archaic states in Assyriology. Second, 
redistribution is a unified, all-encompassing operation 
in which all, or almost all, of the total production of the 
community is “pooled” at the center, with households 
carrying out different productive activities, each fitting 
into the system like specialized parts of an organism. 
Third, both models have been revised on empirical 
and theoretical grounds.
Earle showed in the late 1970s that Hawaiian chiefs 
did not redistribute staples among individual communi-
ties, which were self-sufficient and agriculturally diversi-
fied.21 Instead, redistribution served to finance chiefly 
operations, especially public feasts and support of the 
chief’s followers. Earle called this “redistributive mobi-
lization,” which he contrasted to “pooling.” Most analy-
ses of chiefly finance since Earle’s study therefore have 
not attempted to differentiate redistributive economic 
systems from other types but have focused instead on 
the specific mechanisms of finance and control.22
In the Near East, the situation is somewhat more 
complex, since the redistributive systems vary so much 
across time and space that one cannot speak of “Near 
Eastern redistribution” in general.23 Most Assyriologists 
agree that Mesopotamian centers supported systems 
that can be characterized as redistributive. It now seems 
clear that redistribution was always a partial system that 
17 Renfrew 1972.
18 Deimel 1931; Polanyi 1957b. Liverani (2005, 48–9) points 
out the differences between Deimel’s work and the other ma-
jor economic synthesis of the Near East, Schneider 1920.
19 On the role of Ventris in early use of Near Eastern com-
paranda, see Palaima 2003, 61.
20 Finley 1999, 28.
21 Earle 1977, 1978.
22 E.g., Muller 1997.
23 Liverani 2005.
24 Renger 1994, 179; 1995, 279–80, 284–88.
25 Renger 1995; 2005, 52; van de Mieroop 1999, 106–7, 136. 
For the province of Lagash in the Ur III period, cf. Renger 
1995, 285; Adams 2006, 138 (who cites Sharlach 2004, 62).
26 van de Mieroop 1999, 89–92.
27 Renger 1994, 177.
Fig. 2. Liverani’s model of Bronze Age Near Eastern politi-
cal economy (after Liverani 2005, fig. 2).
operated along with other economic arrangements 
and that functioned to mobilize material upward to 
ruling elites.
The strongest argument for a Polanyian-style redis-
tributive system is made by Renger, who argues that 
in the Ur III period, most of the population was sub-
sumed under the redistributive system.24 There are in-
dications, however, that the situation is not as simple 
as was once thought. Households existed outside the 
redistributive system, as did landholdings: “private” 
and “communal” land existed, although the precise 
extent is debated.25 Most laborers who received rations 
were part-time workers who must have had access to 
other sources of support when not in the employ of 
the state.26 The economic relationship between local 
communities and the palace was of a particular type 
based on labor and control of large agricultural estates 
rather than on the movement of goods, and it thus 
does not correspond to the typical redistributive pat-
tern as defined by Polanyi (see figs. 1, 2). Finally, the 
rations paid out by institutional households supported 
activities that served the goals of elites.27
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As Adams has recently argued, administration in 
the Ur III state “focus[ed] only on a handful of con-
trol points chosen to meet a given set of state goals 
for resource expropriation.”28 The Ur III state is espe-
cially relevant for two interrelated reasons: it often has 
been used as a point of comparison for Aegean palace 
economies, and it has provided the most extreme ex-
ample of a powerful, centralized state economy in the 
Near East. Nevertheless, it is clear that even in the Ur 
III period, the economy was far more diversified and 
complex than Deimel, Finley, or Polanyi had allowed.29 
For other periods of Mesopotamian history, like the 
Old Babylonian and Neo-Babylonian periods, the evi-
dence for economic activity outside the redistributive 
system is even more extensive.30
In the Aegean Bronze Age, scholars inherited two 
ideas about redistribution, one anthropological, 
through Renfrew, and the other Assyriological, through 
Finley and Ventris. Both emphasized redistribution as 
a hypercentralized economic system that controlled 
virtually all aspects of economic production and distri-
bution. But recent work has shown that most, perhaps 
all, such economic practices are better characterized 
as systems of mobilization, whereby goods flow upward 
to support elites and their retainers. Seen this way, 
mobilization represents a strategy used by the central 
elite to consolidate power and prestige.31 Halstead’s 
analysis of the Mycenaean textual evidence shows that 
the same was true in Late Bronze Age Greece: pala-
tial finances were largely focused on the production 
of finely crafted goods, which could be distributed to 
supporters or exchanged abroad, and the support of 
rituals such as feasts, which legitimated the political 
authority of the palace.32
what, then, of redistribution?
This brief survey suggests that redistribution in the 
strict sense is not a particularly useful concept for char-
acterizing specific forms of economic organization. 
This is hardly surprising, given that Polanyi never in-
tended redistribution to serve as an explanatory model 
or even a Weberian ideal type.33 For Polanyi, redistri-
bution could describe a broad range of economic ac-
tivities, from family sharing to ancient empires to the 
modern welfare state. At the broadest analytical level, 
that of comparative economics, redistribution may be 
a meaningful category, but at the analytical level of 
individual societies or even wider cultures, it can be 
problematic and misleading.34 One reason for this is 
that as a general model of exchange characterized by 
centricity, it subsumes so many different economic sys-
tems that it fails to connote anything very meaningful 
about a specific case. Indeed, the purpose of the con-
cept of redistribution for Polanyi and his students was 
to allow them to investigate the differences between 
different redistributive systems, embedded as they 
were in society at large, not to construct a monolithic 
model of “redistribution” and apply it wholesale to 
different historical contexts. That is, we ought not to 
be discussing whether a given society is redistributive 
or not, but how it is redistributive.
Earle’s typology of redistribution, published in 1977,
was an initial step in this direction (fig. 3). Earle dif-
ferentiated between leveling systems (which coun-
teract the concentration of wealth) and institutional 
systems, which he further subdivided by scale, from 
householding to mobilization. This typology measures 
only two variables, however: effect on concentrations 
of wealth and spatial extent. Focusing on economic 
outcomes makes sense from an archaeological per-
spective, since they presumably will correlate with cer-
tain patterns in the material record, but is problematic 
given that elites often sought to convert wealth into 
prestige or symbolic capital.
Earle’s typology also reveals that what we call re-
distribution is actually the product of multiple types 
of exchange that can intersect with one another and 
operate at different scales. For example, household-
ing very often coexists with mobilization. This is not, 
however, how redistribution is usually employed in 
models of the ancient economy. Instead, it has been 
used as a totalizing model of how the entirety, or ma-
jority, of the economic life of a society was organized, 
held together by one monolithic system. Hence, Fin-
ley described Near Eastern redistribution as a unitary 
top-down phenomenon, and this has become the para-
digm for the Aegean.35 Yet we now know that even in 
the most extreme cases, Near Eastern states were not 
the all-encompassing redistributive entities that Fin-
ley thought they were. We should therefore probably 
28 Adams 2006, 165.
29 van de Mieroop 1999, 89–92.
30 Stol 2004, 919–44; Jursa 2005.
31 Earle 1977; Brumfi el and Earle 1987.
32 Halstead 1992, 2007.
33 Dalton 1990. Note that Polanyi (1968, 150) asserts that 
“the organization and validation of such a [redistributive]
center does not come about merely as a consequence of fre-
quent acts of sharing as between individuals.” Polanyi there-
fore does not seem to think redistribution explains the 
emergence of leadership, whereas evolutionary theorists such 
as Service did.
34 See also Testart 2005, 79.
35 Finley 1999, 28; Killen 2008, 159–61.
REDISTRIBUTIVE ECONOMIES2011] 181
not apply the singular noun “redistribution” to char-
acterize these systems but rather focus our efforts on 
describing the multiple systems embedded within the 
economy of a given society. These systems operated 
on the basis of membership: dependent laborers work-
ing for the palace received subsistence rations, high-
status laborers received larger allotments of staples or 
land, members of kin groups were allocated food as 
members of the household, and so on. Similarly, par-
ticipation in feasts, an important type of redistributive 
mechanism, also was based on group membership.
Prehistoric redistributive systems might have oper-
ated according to a single transactional mode or dif-
ferent transactional modes. For example, the entire 
society might have been organized as a patrimonial 
kingdom, in which case all redistributions could be 
based on the household model.36 Alternatively, patri-
monial householding might have coexisted with pala-
tial mobilization based on taxation and the production 
of high-value wealth items distributed to local elites 
(i.e., a form of wealth finance).37 The analysis of the 
modalities of exchange within redistributive systems 
therefore should be a profitable approach to describ-
ing ancient political economies.38 For example, Earle 
and others have applied the Polanyian concept of 
staple and wealth finance to ancient states, and this 
interpretive framework also has proved useful to Ae-
geanists.39 It is clear that most exchanges conducted 
by Mycenaean palaces, for example, involved staples, 
but some of these staples were converted into other 
commodities, especially textiles, through the institu-
tional support of craft specialists with rations (fig. 4). 
However, even within textile production, there was 
room for considerable variation: Mycenaean palaces 
received textiles through taxation, support of fully de-
pendent female workers, and direct payments of staple 
goods to individuals.40 Some of these textiles were, it 
seems, prestige items that could serve as markers of 
status.41 Elsewhere, we each have argued that many 
of the finances of the Mycenaean state were aimed at 
the accumulation of prestige and allegiance through 
different media, from the distribution of wealth items 
to the hosting of large feasts.42
If we attend to Polanyi’s insistence that redistribu-
tion “tends to enmesh the economic system proper in 
social relationships,” then what is important is not that 
Aegean palatial economies were redistributive but how 
such systems operated socially.43 Clearly, there is a sig-
nificant difference between supporting large numbers 
of dependent female textile workers with subsistence 
36 On patrimonialism in the Late Bronze Age eastern Medi-
terranean, see Schloen 2001.
37 D’Altroy and Earle 1985.
38 There is evidence for these modalities in the Linear B 
texts, for which, see Palaima 2001.
39 D’Altroy and Earle 1985; Halstead 1992, 2007; Parkinson 
2007. For Polanyi’s discussion of staple fi nance, see Polanyi 
1968, 185–88, 321–34.
40 Killen 2008.
41 On the production of textiles, see Killen 2008, 177; cer-
tain textiles are described in the Knossos Ld(1) tablets as e-qe-
si-ja, an adjective formed from the title e-qe-ta (follower).
42 Galaty and Parkinson 2007; Nakassis 2010.
43 Polanyi 1968, 15; see also Polanyi 1968, 16, 25.
Fig. 3. Earle’s typology of redistribution (after Earle 1977, fig. 1).
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rations and paying a male weaver with a large quantity 
of grain well above his subsistence needs.44 Both can 
be termed redistributive, since they are each charac-
terized by the same movement of goods (textiles in, 
staples out), with the palatial authority playing a cen-
tral role, but we lose more than we gain by doing so. 
We consequently consider the study of the nature of 
exchanges within a redistributive system particularly 
important, since this involves identifying how eco-
nomic processes operate at a social level—or better, 
how social institutions operate at an economic level. 
Movements of goods can take place through reciproc-
ity, taxation, patrimonialism, and so on. These are 
not objective realities, but mental models produced 
and negotiated by historically situated individuals and 
groups, as Liverani has demonstrated.45 This type of 
unpacking of state finance is, we suggest, far more 
fruitful than the application of simple labels, like re-
distribution, or, for that matter, even mobilization. 
Moreover, Aegeanists are well positioned to contribute 
to theoretical and cross-cultural discussions of political 
economy with rich data sets, which include extensively 
studied chronological sequences spanning the Neo-
lithic and the Bronze Age and a small but very well 
understood corpus of administrative texts.46
Redistribution remains a problematic term. It is 
vague and potentially misleading, since, for many 
scholars, it denotes the wholesale pooling of all eco-
nomic production. More importantly, perhaps, is 
that, in the strict sense, it simply indicates a pattern 
of movements of goods characterized by centricity. 
Polanyi emphasized that redistribution was funda-
mentally a social phenomenon; this implies that the 
study of specific social institutions, such as feasting, 
resource mobilization, craft specialization, and gift 
exchange, are far more interesting topics of study. 
The rich archaeological and textual data sets from the 
Aegean Bronze Age permit us a unique opportunity 
to understand how these different social institutions 
related to one another in early state societies. In so do-
ing, we will be in a position to contribute to a broader 
anthropological and archaeological understanding 
of how other ancient economic and political systems 
developed and operated.
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44 The dependent female textile workers at Pylos have been 
studied by Chadwick 1988. On the subsistence rations provid-
ed to textile workers, see Palmer 1989. The male weaver on PY 
Un 1322, however, is “paid” (the transactional term o-no liter-
ally means “benefi t”) with a large amount of grain, suffi cient 
Fig. 4. A simplified model of Mycenaean “redistribution” of 
staples and wool products.
to support 60 male workers for one month. On PY Un 1322, 
see Chadwick 1964.
45  Liverani 2001.
46  Galaty and Parkinson 2007.
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